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Abstract. This paper deals in depth with some of the emotions that play a role 
in a group recommender system, which recommends sequences of items to a 
group of users. Firstly, it describes algorithms to model and predict the satisfac-
tion experienced by individuals. Satisfaction is treated as an affective state. In 
particular, we model the decay of emotion over time and assimilation effects, 
where the affective state produced by previous items influences the impact on 
satisfaction of the next item. We compare the algorithms with each other, and 
investigate the effect of parameter values by comparing the algorithms’ predic-
tions with the results of an earlier empirical study. We discuss the difficulty of 
evaluating affective models, and present an experiment in a learning domain to 
show how some empirical evaluation can be done. Secondly, this paper pro-
poses modifications to the algorithms to deal with the effect on an individual’s 
satisfaction of that of others in the group. In particular, we model emotional 
contagion and conformity, and consider the impact of different relationship 
types. Thirdly, this paper explores the issue of privacy (feeling safe, not acci-
dentally disclosing private tastes to others in the group) which is related to the 
emotion of embarrassment. It investigates the effect on privacy of different 
group aggregation strategies and proposes to add a virtual member to the group 
to further improve privacy. 
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1 Introduction 
Inspired by Interactive TV, we are interested in recommending sequences of items 
(e.g. news stories, music clips) to groups of users. In (Masthoff, 2004a), we have dis-
cussed ten group aggregation strategies to combine individual ratings into a single 
group rating.  For example, consider the set of individual ratings of items in Table 1, 
ranging from 1 (really hate) to 10 (really like). Assuming time to see six items, an Av-
erage strategy would recommend sequence EFHDJA by averaging over ratings. A 
Least Misery strategy would recommend sequence FEHJDG, taking the minimum of 
ratings. Empirical evaluation showed that the Multiplicative strategy, which multiplies 
ratings, was most successful in satisfying all individuals. 
 
This paper (or a similar version) is not currently under review by a journal or conference, nor will it 
be submitted to such within the next three months. 
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Table 1. Example of individual ratings for ten items (A to J) for a group of three 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
John 10 4 3 6 10 9 6 8 10 8 
Adam 1 9 8 9 7 9 6 9 3 8 
Mary 10 5 2 7 9 8 5 6 7 6 
Average 7 6 4.3 7.3 8.7 8.7 5.7 7.7 6.7 7.3 
 
This paper investigates how to predict the satisfaction of individuals during a se-
quence of items. For instance, how satisfied will Adam be at each point during the se-
quence EFHDJA? A recommender system that adapts to individuals can focus exclu-
sively on maximizing individual satisfaction and for this it suffices to always 
recommend the item with the highest rating. So, there is no need to predict satisfac-
tion accurately. However, if we are interested in keeping a group satisfied, accurate 
prediction of individual satisfaction becomes crucial. To keep the rest of the group 
happy, an individual might need to be confronted occasionally with items they do not 
like. An accurate prediction of satisfaction would help to (a) ensure no individual gets 
too dissatisfied, by presenting unliked items at appropriate times (e.g. when they are 
in a good mood), (b) evaluate group aggregation strategies under various conditions 
without the need for real users, (c) inspire a new optimal group aggregation strategy. 
This paper extends the modelling of satisfaction in (Masthoff, 2004a) by treating 
satisfaction as an affective state and incorporating (a) emotional decay and assimila-
tion and (b) the influence of the group on individual satisfaction. We also explore the 
issue of privacy. 
The paper is organised as follows.1 Section 2 discusses existing literature on affec-
tive state. Section 3 proposes three satisfaction functions based on this literature. Sec-
tion 4 compares the predictions of these functions with the results from an earlier em-
pirical study, and investigates which parameter values are most appropriate. Section 5 
discusses the difficulties of empirically evaluating affective models. Section 6 pre-
sents an empirical study of our satisfaction functions. Section 7 discusses literature on 
how the satisfaction of others may influence an individual’s satisfaction (focusing on 
emotional contagion and conformity), and proposes modifications to the satisfaction 
functions. Section 8 presents an empirical study into the effect of different relation-
ship types on emotional contagion. Section 9 discusses the privacy issues of group re-
commender systems. Section 10 presents an empirical study into the effect on privacy 
of different group aggregation strategies. Finally, Section 11 presents our conclusions.  
2 Individual Satisfaction 
The satisfaction functions proposed in (Masthoff, 2004a) were based on the summa-
tion of satisfaction on preceding items and the impact of a new item. In the simplest 
satisfaction function, the impact of an item was taken to be its rating. Three factors 
were found to improve the functions: (1) inclusion of low ratings (noting dissatisfac-
tion); (2) normalization, which takes into account ratings of not chosen items; and (3) 
                                                          
1
 An earlier version of Sections 1 to 4 has appeared as (Masthoff, 2005). 
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a quadratic, rather than a linear estimate of impact, which makes the difference be-
tween ratings of say 9 and 10 more significant than that between 5 and 6.  
A limitation of these functions is that satisfaction is modeled as increasing with se-
quence length, and being independent of item order. Nevertheless, several reasons 
were given that suggest that order may be important (some related to advertising re-
search, others to comments of subjects in experiments like “it is better to end on a 
high”). In this paper, we will refine the satisfaction function to take this into account.  
It seems reasonable to regard satisfaction as an affective state or mood. Since the 
seventies, psychologists have researched the cognitive effects of mood, finding that it 
significantly impacts perception, attention, memory, information processing, and 
judgement (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). More recently, psychologists and economists 
have started to research Affective Forecasting: how accurately people can predict 
what will make them happy, by how much, and for how long. Many studies have 
found that while people tend to be good at predicting whether they will be happy or 
unhappy, they are bad at predicting by how much and for how long (Wilson & Gil-
bert, 2003). Additionally, our own field has evinced a lot of interest into Affective 
Computing (e.g. Picard, 1997): how computers can recognize and respond to users’ 
emotions, and how computers can simulate having emotions and portray these. We 
will briefly discuss the results out of these areas that seem most relevant to this paper.  
2.1 Mood impacts judgment 
Researchers have consistently found an impact of mood on evaluative judgement (for 
reviews see Oatley & Jenkins, 1996; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). For instance, Isen et al. 
(1978) found that people in a shopping mall who received a small gift that pleased 
them, reported in an unrelated survey a few minutes later that their cars and television 
sets were working better than did people who had not received that gift. 
Much research has been done in the context of persuasion: people in a happy mood 
are easier to persuade than those in a neutral or sad mood (see e.g., Mackie & Worth, 
1989). Mood effects are studied and used in commercial and political advertising 
(e.g., Aylesworth & MacKenzie, 1998; Isbell et al., 2003) with a view to influencing 
people’s mood to make them judge a subsequent ad more favourably. In particular, a 
viewer’s mood (as induced by watching the preceding program) has a significant ef-
fect on brand evaluations (Gardner, 1985; Meloy, 2000), with the viewer responding 
more positively if they were in a more positive mood. The liking of a television pro-
gram has a similar significant effect (Murry et al., 1992; Schumann & Thorson, 
1990). So, when a recommender system presents a sequence of items, viewing the 
first items could induce a mood, which could impact opinions on the next items.  
Film clips are often used to elicit emotions in a laboratory setting, and a number of 
these have been empirically tested and found to consistently induce an emotion 
(Gross & Levenson, 1995;  Rottenberg et al., in press). Researchers comment on the 
difficulty of finding clips that strongly elicit one emotion rather than a blend of sev-
eral emotions. We will need to differentiate between the emotions elicited by the con-
tent of a clip, and the satisfaction with having seen it. For instance, one might be re-
volted by the content of a news item (e.g. on happenings in Iraq), but still be satisfied 
with having seen it. For our modelling, we will for now ignore the emotion elicited by 
  4 
the content, and concentrate on satisfaction in isolation. However, this issue will need 
to be addressed in future, and it will also complicate evaluation.  
2.2 Retrospective feelings can differ from feelings experienced 
A series of studies by Kahneman and colleagues (as reported in Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003) found that the actual feelings experienced (e.g., self-reported pain during a 
colonoscopy) differed from those reported retrospectively. For instance, in one 
colonoscopy experiment, half the subjects were given a small additional period of 
pain after the end of the normal procedure, but surprisingly reported significantly less 
pain than the other subjects (Redelmeier et al., 2003). The retrospective reports were 
heavily influenced by the intensity of the emotional experience when it ended and the 
peak intensity of the experience. This is important to take into account when we try to 
measure satisfaction in an empirical study (to evaluate our models), and poses ques-
tions regarding what kind of satisfaction we ought to model (for instance, satisfaction 
at the end of a sequence of items versus at each point during the sequence).  Note that 
we do not intend to make a recommender system that purposely “leaves the needle in 
longer” (gives additional small misery) to make the experience feel better while ob-
jectively being worse. However, we could change the order of items in the sequence, 
to take these kinds of effects into account.  
2.3 Expectation can influence emotion 
People’s affective forecasting can change their actual emotional experience (e.g., Wil-
son & Klaaren, 1992). Several studies have shown that if you expect to like some-
thing, then you might end up liking it more than if you did not have any expectations. 
For instance, subjects who were told that jokes were going to be funny, found the 
jokes funnier than subjects who had not been told this. This is called assimilation. So, 
if our recommender system has presented several items you liked, than you might ex-
pect to like the next item as well, and therefore your perceived satisfaction with that 
item might be higher than its actual rating merits. It has been suggested that the oppo-
site can also happen (Wilson & Klaaren, 1992): if you expect to like something, you 
might end up liking it less. This is called contrast. Since, according to Wilson and 
Gilbert (2003), hardly any studies support contrast, while several support assimilation, 
we will focus exclusively on the latter. 
2.4 Emotions wear off over time 
People’s emotional reactions become less intense with time, a phenomenon called 
Emotional Evanescence (Wilson et al., 2003). When something has made you happy, 
this happiness does not last, but wears off. This is explained in (Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003) as needed to save energy and to protect the emotions’ role as a signalling de-
vice. Another explanation of Emotional Evanescence is given by adaptation-level the-
ory, which claims that an emotional reaction depends on how the current experience 
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compares to similar past experiences. The example given in (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003) 
is that of temperature: if you have been used to low temperatures, arriving in Florida 
to a temperature of 15° C might please you. After staying for a while, 30° C becomes 
your standard, and a day with the same temperature of 15° C might displease you. 
Note that this is subtly different from the idea of contrast. Adaptation level theory 
does not assume you will expect the weather to be good, and compare the actual 
weather to your expectation, but rather that you will compare it to your standard of 
what constitutes good weather, a standard which has been influenced by your experi-
ences in the past. So, if you were watching a sequence of items, the items you have 
watched so far would give you a standard to compare the next item to. 
As noted by Wilson & Gilbert (2003), a limitation of adaptation-level theory is that 
it does not specify what the comparison point should be. Should we only look at the 
last item or take the average over the last, say five, items? It also does not explain the 
decrease in emotions over time evoked by a single isolated event. For this paper, it is 
sufficient to note that a decrease of emotions over time happens; we will not try to 
model adaptation level theory yet.  
2.5 Ideas from affective computing 
Picard (1997) discusses the use of emotions and moods in computer systems. She de-
scribes emotions as being regulated by moods: for instance, a good mood increases 
the impact of relatively small positive events. She proposes to model mood as a 
weighted summation of the impact of positive events and subtraction of the impact of 
negative events, with the impact of recent events receiving extra weight. She argues 
that mood can not be of unbounded intensity, so a limit should be used (or a saturation 
function). Elliot & Siegle (1993) also mention that prior mood should contribute to 
emotion intensity. They further mention that the relationship between users can influ-
ence emotions (we will return to this issue in Section 7).  
3 Satisfaction Functions Chosen 
In (Masthoff, 2004a), satisfaction with a (fixed-length) sequence of items was calcu-
lated as the sum of the impact on satisfaction of the individual items of the sequence: 
 
     )Impact(   )Sat(  )Sat( iitemsiitems +=><+ ,    for item i and item sequence2 items.  
 Sat(<>) = 0 
 
Based on the literature review above, we will henceforth assume that Satisfaction will 
decrease in intensity over time. Also, we give more weight to recent items3. 
 
Variant 0   1δ0with  ),Impact(   )Sat(  )Sat( ≤≤+×=><+ iitemsiitems δ   
                                                          
2
 Whenever we talk about an item sequence, we mean a sequence of distinct items. 
3
 This deviates from the proposal in (Picard, 1997) of a linear decrease in weight, and only con-
sideration of the last four events.   
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With δ=1 no decrease of satisfaction over time occurs, and with δ=0 no memory of 
past items would be used. The value of δ is likely to depend on personality, as advo-
cated in (Picard, 1997; de Rosis et al., 2003), and item duration. 
The impact of an item depends on the individual’s liking of that item, as captured 
by a preference rating4. Rating(i) will denote the preference rating for item i. To cal-
culate the impact, we perform three steps. 
1. Normalization. In (Masthoff, 2004a), satisfaction produced was normalized, as op-
posed to individual rating, using for item sequence items: 
 
NormSat(items) = )PossSat(
)Sat(
items
items
 
with  PossSat(items) = )(SatMax
)length()length(sequenceitem
s
itemsss =∧
    
Our introduction of δ into the Satisfaction function means that normalization now 
needs to be handled differently. We apply normalization to the rating, not to satis-
faction as a whole, to make it independent of the selections so far. For rating r, 
 Normalized(r) = 
gsPossibleTotalRatin
gsExpectedTotalRatin
×r ,  
with TotalRatingsExpected = ∑
jitem
ingAverageRat   
TotalRatingsPossible  = ∑
j
j
item
)( Rating  
Rather than taking AverageRating to be the midpoint of the scale (5.5), we use the 
average rating over all individuals in the group over all items (6.93 in Table 1).  
Note that normalization results in ratings 10-10-10-10 being treated as the same 
as 5-5-5-5. This was also the case in the normalization in (Masthoff, 2004a). In a 
sense, this is also a form of assimilation.  
 
2. Rebalancing. We rebalance the rating scale by subtracting its midpoint (5.5 for our 
scale), so that negative ratings imply dissatisfaction. 
Rebalanced(r) = r – midpoint,    for rating r 
 
3. Making the impact quadratic. We will use the following formula5: 
 
Quadratic(r) =   r2,     if r ≥ 0;         - r2,  if r < 0,   for rating r 
Combining these three steps, we obtain: 
 
Impact(i) = Quadratic(Rebalanced(Normalized(Rating(i))) , for item i 
                                                          
4
 How ratings have been obtained is beyond the scope of this paper, but they are likely to have 
been inferred rather than explicitly given (see Masthoff, 2004a). Here we assume ratings to 
be accurate. 
5
 This deviates from (Masthoff, 2004a), where no rebalancing occurred and Quadratic(r) was  
(r-5)2, if r ≥6, and -(r-6)2 if r<6. This simplifies dealing with the new normalization of ratings. 
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The satisfaction function discussed above sums the (weighted) satisfaction so far 
with the impact of the new item. The upshot is that satisfaction is predicted to keep 
increasing if a series of items is consistently pleasing. The question arises whether 
summation is indeed the right operation, given that some of the literature discussed 
above says that mood cannot be of unbounded intensity. An alternative would be to 
take the average. We therefore propose the following variant: 
 
Variant 1   
δ1
)Impact(   )Sat(δ
  )Sat(
+
+×
=><+
iitemsiitems   
 
We divide by 1+δ rather than 2, to get Sat(items+<i>) = Impact(i) when δ=0.  
Although the satisfaction function takes decay of emotion into account, it does not 
yet take into account that mood can alter judgement, and that expectation can influ-
ence emotion. Since the literature suggests that impact of an item depends on mood, 
showing an assimilation effect, we propose the following variant:  
 
Variant 2     ))(Satδ,Impact(  )Sat(  )Sat( itemsiitemsiitems ×+×=><+ δ   
with        ε))Impact(()Impact(),Impact( ×−+= isisi ,       for all s and 0 ≤ ε ≤1 
 
This variant ensures for instance that the impact of an item is higher than it would nor-
mally be, if the user’s mood (in terms of satisfaction with the sequence so far) is high. Pa-
rameter ε models the extent to which the user’s mood influences that user’s evaluative 
judgement: with ε = 0 there is no such influence (and we have the same satisfaction 
function as Variant 0), with ε = 1 the influence is so immense that the new item cannot 
have any impact on the user’s mood. 
It is easy to come up with more variants (e.g. combining Variants 1 and 2), but we 
would first like to understand the effects of the satisfaction functions proposed so far. 
4 Simulations 
To gain insight into how the variants differ in their predictions, we ran simulations: 
taking Table 1’s ratings for John, Adam and Mary, and eight different item sequences 
(e.g. FEAHD), each variant predicted how satisfied each individual would be at each 
point during each sequence. Varying values of δ and ε were used. Figure 1 shows ex-
ample results for Variant 0 (for full results see Masthoff, 2005). As can be expected, a 
lower value of δ tends to result in a lower predicted satisfaction. Comparison of the 
results for sequences AIEFD and AEFID shows the impact item order can have, par-
ticularly for small δ. Figure 2 shows example results for Variant 1 (for full results see 
Masthoff, 2005). The ‘averaging’ used in Variant 1 has resulted in a nice limitation of 
satisfaction, rather than an infinite increase. The value of δ clearly has less impact on  
satisfaction for Variant 1 than for Variant 0. Figure 3 shows example results for Vari-
ant 2. There is a large impact of δ: with δ=0.9, all individuals are about equally satis-
fied and the impact of ε is low. With δ=0.2, the individual satisfaction profiles are 
quite different, and the impact of ε is high. 
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Fig. 1. Predicted satisfaction for Variant 0 per sequence per individual, for several values of δ: 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1
. Y-axis shows satisfaction, 
X-axis time (first item shown, second shown, etc) 
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Fig. 2. Predicted satisfaction for Variant 1 per sequence per individual, for several values of δ: 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1
. Y-axis shows satisfaction, 
X-axis time (first item shown, second shown, etc) 
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Fig. 3. Predicted satisfaction of Variant 2 for sequence FEHJDI per individual, for several val-
ues of ε: 0 0.2 0.5 0.8, and two values of δ. Y-axis shows satisfac-
tion, X-axis time (first item shown, second shown, etc) 
The same ratings and sequences had been shown to participants of an experiment 
published in (Masthoff, 2004a), who were asked to predict how satisfied each indi-
vidual would be with the sequence as a whole6. We compared the predictions of the 
variants with those by the participants (as given in Masthoff, 2004a) in order to de-
termine what values of δ and ε best matched the human predictions. As participants 
judged the sequences as a whole, we compared their opinions with the complete satis-
faction curves produced by the Variants, rather than just the end point. So, we regard 
Variant 0’s prediction for AEFID to be that it dissatisfies Adam, as he is predicted to 
be dissatisfied after the presentation of the first and fourth item (for any δ). 
For low values of δ, Variant 0 predicts sequences FEHJDI and EFHDJA to dissat-
isfy Adam, and EFHDJB to dissatisfy John. This contradicts the opinion of partici-
pants, who predicted these sequences to satisfy Adam and John. We therefore con-
clude that a higher value of δ (0.8, 0.9, 1) is more in accordance with the participants’ 
behaviour. This is also supported by the predictions of Variant 2: with δ=0.2, Adam is 
predicted to be dissatisfied at the end, independent of ε. As participants predicted 
Adam to be satisfied, again a higher value of δ seems better. It is harder to see which 
value of ε produces the best match with participants’ behaviour. Participants predicted 
Adam and Mary to be equally satisfied with FEHJDI, and John to be slightly more 
satisfied. When looking at the end of the sequence, a lower value of ε seems to match 
participants’ opinions slightly better. When looking at the curves as a whole (e.g., av-
eraging satisfaction over the sequence), John would be more dissatisfied than Adam, 
independent of ε. 
The eight sequences used are those recommended by various group aggregation 
strategies (as described in Masthoff, 2004a). We investigated whether the simulation 
results could provide insight into the suitability of these strategies. Variants 0 and 1 
both predict Adam to be dissatisfied with sequences FEAHD, AEFID and AEIBDF, in-
dependent of the value of δ. Hence, the strategies that recommend these sequences 
(Borda,Plurality and Most Pleasure as described in Masthoff, 2004a) can be excluded. 
                                                          
6
 Reasons for the indirectness of that experiment are given in (Masthoff, 2004a) and Section 5. 
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This is in-line with the conclusion in (Masthoff, 2004a), which was based on partici-
pants’ opinion. Restricting ourselves to higher values of δ, if we take the satisfaction 
of the group to be the minimum of the satisfaction of the individuals, then in Variant 0 
FEHJDI clearly performs best: for each moment in the sequence, it gives the highest 
satisfaction (except after the second item for δ is 0.8 and 0.9). This sequence was rec-
ommended by the Multiplicative strategy, which was also the strategy preferred by 
the participants. However, if we take the satisfaction of the group to be the average of 
the satisfaction of the individuals, then the Average strategy performs best. Taking the 
minimum corresponds better to the predictions of our subjects. 
Variant 1 also predicted Adam to be dissatisfied with EFHDJA independent of δ. 
This contradicts the opinions of participants, who predicted this sequence to satisfy 
Adam. There are three possible explanations. Firstly, the ‘averaging’ in Variant 1 may 
be wrong. Secondly, participants’ predictions may be wrong. Thirdly, both the ‘aver-
aging’ and subjects’ predictions may be correct, but something else in the satisfaction 
function is wrong, like the normalization (or the constant used in it), or the use of 
quadratic ratings.  
5 Inherent Complexity of Empirical Evaluation 
We have shown how we can use satisfaction functions to reason about group aggrega-
tion strategies, even when these functions are not yet completely validated. For in-
stance, several strategies performed badly, independently of δ, and of whether ‘aver-
aging’ was used. Comparing the satisfaction functions with predictions by subjects, 
allowed us to conclude that δ should have a high value (for this particular task), and 
given such a high value, the Multiplicative strategy performed best. However, there is 
a problem: the empirical data used comes from an indirect experiment, where subjects 
were not shown items, but only ratings, and had to predict satisfaction. As discussed 
above, the Affective Forecasting literature shows that people are very poor at predict-
ing the intensity of emotions7. So, a next step should be to empirically compare the 
real satisfaction experienced by subjects with that predicted by the satisfaction func-
tions. However, this is particularly challenging; indeed it was the topic of an “evalua-
tion challenge” for the 2005 UM workshop on the Evaluation of Adaptive Systems.  
Firstly, as pointed out by David Chin’s entry to the competition, items can evoke a 
wide range of emotional responses (Chin, 2005). It may be hard to distil satisfaction 
from these. Secondly, accurate ratings for the individuals are needed. We could ask 
subjects to rate items, but if our assumption is right, then their rating would depend on 
presentation order. Although this could be avoided by introducing long intervals be-
tween items, this would increase the likelihood that subjects’ moods vary. Attempts to 
iron out these issues through items that elicit identical ratings for all subjects failed 
(Masthoff, 2004a). This individual variation in the emotive value of items is also 
noted by Chin (2005), who points out that a song that instils happiness in the majority 
may evoke sadness in someone whom it reminds of a deceased friend. A further com-
plication is that such associations vary over time: the appraisal of a song that reminds 
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 People are, however, good at predicting valence, so this does not invalidate our conclusions 
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someone of their spouse will depend on the state of the marriage, making it hard to 
ask subjects to rate items on one day, and then to do the experiment on a later date.  
Thirdly, items should be unrelated, as topical relatedness can influence judgement 
(e.g. an item about an earthquake in Bulgaria getting a higher rating after an item on 
their team playing Bulgaria) (Masthoff, 2004a). In the case of music recommenda-
tions the tempo and genre of the songs is likely to have such an impact (Chin, 2005).  
Finally, we need to know how satisfied each subject is after each item has been 
presented. Though self-reporting has been suggested as a convenient and relatively 
accurate way of measuring affective state (de Vicente, 2003), it poses two potential 
problems. Firstly, if subjects are asked at the end of an experiment to judge their satis-
faction at preceding time points, reports are likely to be inaccurate, given the differ-
ence between retrospective and experienced emotions. Secondly, asking subjects to 
report satisfaction during the experiment takes time and may influence the results 
(given the decrease in emotions over time). Using sensor data has been suggested as a 
more accurate way to determine affective state as it avoids introspection (for an over-
view see Picard et al., 2004). However, if we determine satisfaction on the basis of 
sensor data (e.g. heart rate as suggested by Chin, 2005), the emotional content of 
items can influence results. Also, as indicated by Chin (2005) sensor data seems better 
at spotting the absence or presence of an emotion (e.g, like or dislike) than the actual 
strength of the emotion, which is most relevant for evaluating our models. Finally, 
sensors tend to be both costly and intrusive. 
6 Experiment 1: Empirical Evaluation on a Learning Task 
As discussed above, empirical evaluation of our satisfaction functions is inherently 
complex. In this section, we nevertheless present a first empirical study8, the purpose 
of which is (a) to yield insight into our satisfaction functions and (b) to explore how 
studies of this kind can be conducted.  
To overcome some of the problems discussed above, the study was conducted in a 
learning domain, rather than a recommender domain. A learner’s affective state is 
likely to be multidimensional: Kort et al. (2001) distinguishes between the dimensions of 
anxiety-confidence, boredom-fascination, frustration-euphoria, dispirited-encouraged, 
terror-enchantment. Heylen et al. (2003) adds social emotions, like embarrassment and 
pride. We focused on  satisfaction with performance,  using our satisfaction functions to 
model learners’ satisfaction with their performance on a sequence of tasks. Järvenoja 
& Järvelä (2005) found that performance is an important source of emotion in secon-
dary school students.  
For this experiment, a learning domain was chosen over a recommender domain 
for a number of reasons. The setup of the experiment required items for which we 
could accurately predict satisfaction. As discussed above, such items are hard to ob-
tain in a recommender domain. In contrast, we hypothesised that we could accurately 
modify task difficulty, and that task difficulty would correlate with satisfaction with 
                                                          
8
 This experiment happened  before the Evaluation of Adaptive System challenge. 
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performance. It also seemed easier in a learning domain to avoid the topical related-
ness problems discussed above, and to keep the tasks free of emotional content. 
Weiner (1995) distinguishes between two affects relating to achievement: ‘out-
come-dependent’ (how well you did) and ‘attribution-linked’ (was it because of what 
you did or not). So, it may be that a learner’s satisfaction with their performance de-
pends not only on how well they performed, but also on how difficult they perceived 
the task to be. If they perceive the task to be very difficult, then they could be satisfied 
with a lower score than if they perceived the task to be easy. This is not covered in the 
models above, and it will be part of the evaluation to see if such an effect does occur.  
6.1 Adjustment and addition to the models 
Before performing the experiment, two changes were made to the modelling. First, we 
defined a learner’s satisfaction with a task t as:  
 Sat(<t>) = Impact(t). 
 
This is a slight variation on the models given in Section 3, as it results in a different 
value of Sat(<t>) for Variants 1 and 2. After all, in Section 3, we had defined Sat(<>) 
= 0  rather than defining  Sat(<t>). This resulted in  
 
Sat(<t>) = Sat(<>+<t>) = 
(δ×Sat(<>)+Impact(t)) / (1+δ) = Impact(t) / (1+δ)          for Variant 1 
= δ×Sat(<>) + Impact(t,δ×Sat(<>)) =  
  Impact(t,0) = Impact(t) + (0-Impact(t))×ε = (1-ε)×Impact(t)    
 
for Variant 2 
This seems counter intuitive, hence we now define Sat(<t>) instead. Secondly, a vari-
ant of the models was added, which basically combines Variants 1 and 2:  
 
Variant 3    
δ1
))(Satδ,Impact(  )Sat(δ
  )Sat(
+
×+×
=><+
itemsiitemsiitems   
6.2 Experimental Design 
6.2.1 Method and Procedure 
For the purpose of this experiment, it was essential to have a carefully controlled task 
setting, allowing an accurate a priori estimate of task difficulty. For this reason, a 
lexical decision task (a standard paradigm in psycholinguistic research, see e.g. 
Harley, 2001) was administered, using DMDX, a software package for running reac-
tion time experiments (Forster & Forster, 2003). In each task, subjects were exposed 
to twenty letter strings flashing for short intervals in succession on a computer screen, 
and asked to decide whether the string was a real English word or not by pressing a 
designated “yes” or “no” key. In each task, ten word and ten non-word strings were 
used in a randomized order. Error rates and reaction times were recorded; however, 
we will only discuss error data below. Before the start of the experiment, a practice 
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task, using numbers instead of words, was administered to familiarise them with the 
software. 
Task difficulty depends on at least two factors. The first is the time window in 
which subjects are exposed to a string and have to respond. Our experiment kept this 
constant across tasks: strings were flashed on screen for 800ms and a response had to 
be made within 2000ms from the onset of each string. An inter-stimulus interval of 
750ms was also provided, during which the screen was blank. The second factor af-
fecting task difficulty, and the one manipulated in our experiment, is the familiarity of 
the words presented. Familiarity of words was systematically varied across tasks, such 
that one task was “easy”, one “medium” and one “difficult”. 
Subjects were divided into two groups (A and B), differing only in the order in 
which the difficult and easy tasks were presented. Both groups did the medium task 
(M) last. Group A subjects saw the other tasks in the order difficult (D) – easy (E), 
while Group B had the opposite order (E – D). Our satisfaction functions imply that 
the order of tasks impacts satisfaction. Our between subject design allows us to inves-
tigate this. Best values for δ and ε will be investigated across the sample as a whole. 
In order to assess their affective state at the start of the experiment, subjects were 
first asked to rate their current mood, using a slider going from a sad face to a happy 
face. The slider position returned a value in the interval (1,100). This method makes 
the “mood” variable continuous (i.e. it is measured on a ratio scale). Thus, it permits 
explicit comparison of different measures, which is not the case with nominal or ordi-
nal scales (such as “Likert-type” measurements). The latter are rather coarse-grained 
in that (a) they restrict subjects to predefined measures; (b) the distance between adja-
cent points on the scale is unknown. 
After each of the three tasks, subjects received feedback on the number of correct 
answers (e.g. “you answered 15 from 20 correctly”), followed by two questions to as-
sess their affective state, namely:  
• “How satisfied are you with your performance on the last task?” 
• “How satisfied are you with your performance so far?” 
The questions were answered using the same type of slider as per the initial mood rat-
ing. There was an inter-task interval of 2.5 minutes.  Each task took about 1 minute. 
6.2.2 Subjects 
Twenty-two students of the University of Aberdeen participated in the experiment in 
exchange for entry in a prize draw. Eleven subjects were randomly assigned to each 
experimental condition. Subjects self-rated their fluency in English, choosing from 
“native”, “non-native but fluent” and “non-fluent”.  
6.2.3 Materials  
Each task consisted of 10 words and 10 non-word strings, all of five characters in 
length and composed of two syllables. For each real word, there was a non-word 
string with an identical initial character. Non-words were selected from the database 
of the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2002). Real words were selected from 
the MRC psycholinguistic database, a machine-readable dictionary containing psy-
cholinguistic norms for English words (Wilson, 1988), including norms for subjective 
familiarity ratings obtained from native speakers. The normalised scale for subjective 
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word familiarity in MRC ranges from 100 to 700. Under the assumption that word 
recognition would be more difficult for less familiar words, task difficulty was opera-
tionalised by identifying the following three intervals on this scale: 
• easy (E): 450- 600; medium (M): 300 – 450; difficult (D): 200 - 300 
The frequency of the words selected, obtained from the British National Corpus 
(BNC; Aston & Burnard, 1998), correlated significantly with subjective familiarity. In 
fact, the log-transformed frequency and the subjective familiarity ratings of the se-
lected words presented a near-perfect correlation ( r = .946; p < .01 ). 
6.2.5 Research Questions 
The aim of the experiment was to answer the following research questions:  
• Is it possible to reliably manipulate satisfaction with individual tasks by manipulat-
ing task difficulty? In particular, we need to establish  
− whether task difficulty can be reliably manipulated, that is, whether D is more 
difficult than E, and M of intermediate difficulty  
− that a higher score results in higher satisfaction, and that task difficulty does not 
influence subjects’ satisfaction with their score (to exclude the ‘attribution-
linked’ sense of achievement discussed above). Are subjects indeed more satis-
fied with their (higher) score on E than their (lower) score on D?  
• Which variants of the satisfaction function perform best? Emotion wearing off pre-
dicts that having the easier task first would result in lower satisfaction after two 
tasks (given that satisfaction with task 1 will have decayed). Assimilation predicts 
that having the easier task first would result in higher satisfaction after two tasks, 
as satisfaction with good performance on the first task would increase expectations 
of good performance on the second, resulting in higher satisfaction overall. Vari-
ants 0 and 1 do not model assimilation, so if they are correct then we should find 
that group A (who had the easier task last) is more satisfied after two tasks than 
group B. Variants 2 and 3 model emotions wearing off as well as assimilation, so 
they may be true regardless of whether we find a difference or not.  
• What values for δ and ε produce the best fit? Do we indeed need values per user? 
6.3 Results and discussion 
6.3.1 Task difficulty 
Table 2 shows the average performance over all subjects on tasks D, E, and M. In this 
section, we report p-values on pairwise t-tests unless otherwise stated. The manipula-
tion of task difficulty proved reliable, with D more difficult than E (p<.00001), and M 
at an intermediate level significantly below D (p<.00001) and above E (p<.05). Inde-
pendent samples t-tests confirmed that Group A and B differed reliably on their first 
(p<.005) and second (p<.005) tasks. 
Table 2. Correct responses over all subjects. 
 Task D Task E Task M 
Average  12.2 17.1 16 
Standard Deviation 2.8 2.6 2.7 
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6.3.2 Comparability of groups: performance and initial mood 
To ensure that the groups were homogeneous, we compared initial mood and task per-
formance. Table 3 shows the correct responses per group. No significant differences 
were observed between groups on D (p>.7), E (p>.1), M (p>.1), and all tasks com-
bined (p>.3). Thus, group performance was homogeneous and independent of task order. 
Table 4 shows the self-reported initial mood of subjects in both groups. Slider re-
sults were transformed by deducting the midpoint of the scale (50), dividing by ten 
(obtaining a scale from -5 to 5), and squaring while maintaining the sign (obtaining 
results between -25 and 25). All other slider results will be transformed in the same 
way. One subject in group B was an outlier in the initial mood rating (-19.22) and was 
excluded from all subsequent analyses regarding satisfaction. No difference was 
found between the groups’ initial mood (t-test, p>.7), suggesting homogeneity.  
Table 3. Correct responses per group for each task presented. 
Group A Group B  
Average STDEV Average STDEV 
First task 12 2.9 18 1.3 
Second task 16.3 3.2 12.5 2.9 
Third task 15.7 2.6 16.3 2.9 
Over all tasks 44 7.7 46.7 5.5 
Table 4. Self-reported initial mood 
Before removing outliers After removing outliers  
Average STDEV Average STDEV 
Mood of group A 5.01 5.03 5.01 5.03 
Mood of group B 3.50 8.82 5.77 4.84 
6.3.3 Satisfaction with performance on individual tasks 
To test whether task difficulty indeed predicts satisfaction with performance on indi-
vidual tasks, we compared subjects’ satisfaction with their performance on individual 
tasks for the three tasks, shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Self-reported satisfaction of subjects with individual task performance.  
All subjects Group A Group B  
Average STDEV Average STDEV Average STDEV 
Task D -3.14 4.86 -3.40 4.55 -2.86 5.40 
Task E 8.66 9.97 7.50 10.21 9.94 10.09 
Task M 5.63 7.24 6.38 8.44 4.81 5.98 
Over all tasks 11.15 16.33 10.48 18.42 11.90 14.64 
 
Satisfaction with performance on E and M was significantly greater than for D 
(p<.0001), but no significant difference was found between satisfaction for E and M 
(p>.06), despite a significant (but small) difference in their performance between those 
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two tasks. The trend is however in the right direction, suggesting that task difficulty can 
indeed predict individual satisfaction, in that increased difficulty results in lower individ-
ual satisfaction. There were no significant differences between groups on satisfaction 
ratings for individual tasks or in the overall satisfaction ratings (p>.5 for all compari-
sons).  
6.3.4 Satisfaction with overall performance 
Figure 4 shows subjects’ satisfaction with overall performance. We focus on subjects’ 
satisfaction after the second and third tasks, as both groups have had the same two (or 
three) tasks by then. Variants 0 and 1 of the satisfaction function would predict that 
Group B subjects, who had the easy task first, would have lower overall satisfaction 
after the second task (as a consequence of emotions wearing off). However, the trend 
in the graph is in the opposite direction, though the difference is not significant (p>.2). 
This may be due to assimilation, as modelled in Variants 2 and 3. Another feature of 
Figure 4 is the apparently steeper slope in change of satisfaction for Group B after the 
first task, compared to that for Group A. This difference also failed to reach signifi-
cance (p>.2).  
 
Overall satisfaction after  Average STDEV 
Group A -3.40 4.55 First task  
Group B 9.94 10.09 
Group A 1.12 5.08 First  
two tasks  Group B 2.87 4.29 
Group A 2.53 4.82 All three 
tasks  Group B 3.36 5.47 
-4
-2
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Fig. 4. Satisfaction of subjects with overall performance after each task. 
Comparing subjects’ satisfaction with their performance on the third task on its 
own (Table 5) to the increase in their overall satisfaction due to the third task, it is 
clear that the increase is a lot smaller than it would have been if a simple addition was 
taking place. Similarly, for group B, the decrease in overall satisfaction due to the 
second task is a lot larger than subjects’ dissatisfaction with their performance on this 
task9. The most obvious explanation of both these observations is that rather than 
summation, some kind of averaging is taking place, suggesting that Variants 1 and 3 
are to be preferred to Variants 0 and 2. Combined with our earlier observation that the 
                                                          
9
 In contrast to the first case, this can not have been caused by emotions wearing off over time. 
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results conflict with the predictions of Variants 0 and 1, and favour the assimilation 
modelled in Variants 2 and 3, this may mean that Variant 3 models satisfaction best. 
6.3.5 Comparison with Variants 1 and 3 and parameter values 
To analyse this further, we investigated how well Variants 1 and 3 (the two variants 
that used a form of averaging) can fit the data, for varying values of δ and ε.  
First, we investigated the value of δ that yields the optimal fit of Variant 1 to the 
experimental data. As we suspect δ to be different per subject, we compared predicted 
and actual satisfaction for each subject for varying values of δ. Since after one task 
the predicted satisfaction equals per definition the reported satisfaction, we made 
comparisons after two and three tasks, calculating the error rate as the sum of squares: 
ErrorRate =  (PredictedSat(<T1T2>) - ReportedSat(<T1T2>))2 +  
  (PredictedSat(<T1T2T3>) - ReportedSat(<T1T2T3>))2 
We considered calculating predicted satisfactions based on subjects’ reported satis-
faction with each individual task only. According to Variant 1, with Sat being the sat-
isfaction predicted by the model: 
δ1
)(Impact)Impact(δ
δ1
)(Impact)Sat(δ)Sat( 212121
+
+×
=
+
+><×
=><
TTTTTT  
δ1
)(Impact)Sat(δ)Sat( 321321
+
+><×
=><
TTTTTT  
Assuming Impact(T) = ReportedSat(<T>) for all tasks T, this will allow us to calcu-
late Sat(<T1T2>) and subsequently Sat(<T1T2T3>).  
A problem is that Sat(<T1T2 T3>) and Sat(<T1T2>) are not independent, the former 
is calculated using the latter. So, any errors in the modelling early on will be propa-
gated. Therefore, we have used an alternative method. To calculate Sat(<T1T2 T3>), 
we use ReportedSat(<T1T2>) instead of Sat(<T1T2>). Similarly, to calculate 
Sat(<T1T2>), we use ReportedSat(<T1>)10. This means that we are focusing on the ex-
tent to which the models correctly predict changes in satisfaction. So, we calculate 
predicted satisfaction as: 
δ1
)t(ReportedSa)t(ReportedSaδ)at(PredictedS 2121
+
><+><×
=><
TTTT   
δ1
)t(ReportedSa)t(ReportedSaδ)at(PredictedS 321321
+
><+><×
=><
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Figure 5 shows the error rate for subjects in both groups for varying values of δ. 
Variant 1 seems very bad at predicting the satisfaction of some subjects. For those 
subjects a higher value of δ produces a lower error rate, with δ=1 producing the best 
results for eleven subjects (six in group A, five in group B). What may not be clearly 
visible in the graphs is that for eight subjects (four in each group), δ of 0.4 or below 
produces the best results, confirming the suspicion that δ is user dependent.  
                                                          
10Though this does not make any difference, as PredictedSat(<T1>)=ReportedSat(<T1>). 
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Fig. 5. Error rate as a function of δ, for δ between 0 and 1. Each line represents a subject. 
Graph on the left shows subjects in group A, graph on the right shows subjects in group B. 
To bring the error rate down further for many subjects a value of δ greater than 1 
would be required. However, this conflicts with the idea that δ models the wearing off 
of emotions over time. Hence, Variant 1 seems implausible. Once again, the suspicion 
arises that we are seeing an assimilation effect. We will investigate this below, by see-
ing whether ε in Variant 3 can substantially improve the fit.  
Next, we will investigate which values of δ and ε produce the best fit of Variant 3 
to the experimental data, using the same procedure as for Variant 1. Using the for-
mula from Variant 3, we calculate predicted satisfaction as: 
 
=>< )at(PredictedS 21TT
 
δ1
ε))(tReportedSaMood()t(ReportedSaMood 22
+
×><−+><+ TT
  
with  )(tReportedSaδMood 1 ><×= T  
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δ1
ε))(tReportedSaMood()t(ReportedSaMood 33
+
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with  )(tReportedSaδMood 21 ><×= TT  
 
Table 6 shows the values of δ and ε that produce the best fit of Variant 3 to the 
data, and the error rate for those values. There are still some subjects with a rather 
high error rate, but overall Variant 3 has improved the error rate substantially. For in-
stance, compare the error rate of subject A10 from Variant 1 (138.46) with that from 
Variant 3 (0.14). The assimilation parameter ε seems to be useful. So, overall Variant 
3 is best. The results also confirm our suspicion that both δ and ε are user dependant.  
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Table 6. Values of δ and ε that produce the best fit of Variant 3 to the data, and the error rate 
for those values.  
Group A Group B 
Subject δ ε Error Rate Subject δ ε Error Rate 
A1 0.9 0 12.56 B1 0 1 0.06 
A2 1 0.5 1.32 B2 0 0.7 1.09 
A3 0.4 0 7.56 B3 0.8 0.7 0.01 
A4 0 1 0.07 B5 1 0.5 13.36 
A5 0 0 26.74 B6 0 0.9 11.57 
A6 0.1 0.9 0.32 B7 1 0.3 34.37 
A7 0.5 0.4 0.02 B8 0 0.9 1.32 
A8 0.6 1 0.93 B9 0 0.3 6.29 
A9 0 0.4 4.82 B10 0.4 0 0.01 
A10 0.3 0.8 0.14 B11 0.1 0 0.02 
A11 0.1 0.6 0.00  
6.3.6 Limitations of this experiment and future work 
Showing that values of  δ and ε can be found that produce a decent fit for existing 
data  does not necessarily imply that the values generalise to new data. In a follow-up 
experiment, we will use longer task sequences, for instance with six tasks, determine 
values of δ and ε based on the first three tasks, and then investigate how well Variant 
3 fits the data of the last three tasks. The best value of δ may well depend on the time 
duration of the tasks: if tasks are longer, emotions could wear off more. Since this ex-
periment had a short duration, lasting approximately 15 minutes in total, we need to 
investigate the effect of longer task durations. We note, however, that whilst the lim-
ited task duration may have reduced emotional decay, we found δ<1 in Variant 3 to 
provide the best fit to the experimental data for most subjects, suggesting that emo-
tional decay did occur. The inter-task interval will also have contributed to this. 
Moreover, this work is inspired by interactive TV, and the length of news items and 
music clips is rather limited as well, so, it is interesting for us to investigate how good 
our satisfaction functions perform under those conditions.    
7 Group influences on satisfaction 
Until now, we have assumed that an individual’s satisfaction only depends upon the 
experiences of that individual (their liking of items and the item order). It is, however, 
likely that the feelings of others in the group may influence an individual’s satisfac-
tion. Research in organizational behavior and social psychology has highlighted the 
roles of emotional contagion, the influence of an individual’s affective state on that of 
others in the group (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield et al., 1994), as well as conformity, 
whereby judgments are influenced by those of others. This potentially impacts satis-
faction, an issue we turn to below.  
  20 
7.1. Emotional Contagion 
Effects of emotional contagion have been found in both field and laboratory studies. 
Totterdell et al. (1998) and Bartel and Saavedra (2000) found evidence of mood con-
vergence within groups, and Barsade (2002) showed that emotional contagion hap-
pens for negative as well as positive emotions.  
Emotional contagion does not affect everyone to the same degree (Doherty, 1997; 
Laird et al., 1994). Doherty proposed and validated a 15-item scale for measuring this 
susceptibility. Emotional contagion seems also to depend on the attention that is being 
paid to others (Hatfield et al., 1994), and non-verbal cues seem particularly important 
in “catching” others’ emotions (Mehrabian, 1972). This may mean that emotional 
contagion is more likely to happen in a music recommendation system, than a TV 
news recommendation system, as people may be more aware of others in the group 
when their eyes are not fixed on a television screen.  
Most evidence on emotional contagion points to its being a sub-conscious, auto-
matic process (e.g. Hatfield et al., 1994). In addition, there is some evidence (as re-
ported in Barsade, 2002) that comparison of one’s emotions to those of others may 
motivate conscious emotion adaptation, changing the real emotion felt rather than just 
the display of it.  
It is rather difficult to model emotional contagion, as the satisfactions of users are 
interdependent: the satisfaction of a user and the group she is in will be mutually rein-
forcing. For simplification, we will assume that contagion happens simultaneously, 
and that the satisfaction of each user is only influenced by the “independent” satisfac-
tion of the other users, i.e. their satisfaction before contagion happened. So, we define 
the satisfaction of an individual user u with a sequence items in the context of a group 
g as the independent satisfaction of that user ( Sat(u, items)11 ) summed with the con-
tagion from other users’ independent satisfaction:  
 
Sat(u, items, g) = Sat(u, items) + ∑
∈g
itemsvitemsu
 v
 )) ,Sat( ), ,Sat(Contagion(  
 
There seem to be two obvious ways of modelling the contagion of the satisfaction 
of a user u
 
by the satisfaction of a user v. Either we assume that the contagion only 
depends on the other person’s satisfaction, and define: 
 
Contagion(Sat(u, items), Sat(v, items)) = ζ * Sat(v, items) 
 
Or we assume that it depends on a comparison between an individual’s satisfaction 
and another user’s, defining:  
 
Contagion(Sat(u, items), Sat(v, items)) =  ζ * (Sat(v, items) - Sat(u, items)) 
 
                                                          
11
 We will use Sat(u, items), though we only defined Sat(items) before. This enables us to dis-
tinguish between multiple users’ satisfaction, and to have parameters (like δ and ε) dependent 
on the user.   
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The value of ζ depends on the susceptibility of the user to emotional contagion. Until 
now, we have assumed the user will “catch” the other users’ emotions, becoming hap-
pier if the group is happier, and sadder if they are sadder. This would mean ζ ≥ 0. 
However, resentment and gloating (e.g., Ortony et al., 1988) may play a role, in which 
case ζ could be negative (for instance, a child may feel devastated when its siblings 
get a larger piece of cake)12. The true nature and extent of contagion is in any case 
likely to depend on the relationship of an individual and her cohorts.  
7.2 Types of relationships 
Anthropologists and social psychologists have found substantial evidence for the exis-
tence of four basic types of social relationships: communal sharing, authority ranking, 
equality matching, and market pricing (Fiske, 1992; Haslam, 1994). In communal 
sharing relationships, all group members share in the group’s resources as needed and 
depend on one another for mutual support. Authority ranking relationships are asym-
metric: one person has precedence over the other (e.g., because they are your boss, 
parent, older, or somebody you respect). In equality matching relationships, everyone 
gets the same, takes turns, independent of needs or status. In market pricing relation-
ships a kind of bartering takes place, and tradeoffs are made (for instance, you can 
watch television, if you have done the washing-up first). The question is how these 
kinds of relationships might impact the influence others’ emotions have on your own.  
In a communal sharing relationship, you are likely to feel empathy with others. 
This empathy would mean that others’ satisfaction affects your own satisfaction posi-
tively, and others’ dissatisfaction affects it negatively. Therefore, for communal shar-
ing relationships, a positive value of ζ seems most likely.  
In an authority ranking relationship, you are likely to be influenced a lot by the 
people above you due to respect (or fear). However, depending on personality, it may 
also be possible to feel pity for the people below you. Therefore, for authority ranking 
relationships, a higher positive value of ζ seems likely for users ranking above you, 
and a low or close to zero positive value of ζ for users ranking below you. 
In a market pricing relationship, you are likely to mainly care about yourself, 
whether you are getting a “good deal”. This could either lead to indifference regard-
ing others (as you only care about yourself) or to jealousy (as you compare the deal 
you got to the deal others got). If somebody else seems happier, you might feel that 
they got a better deal and feel resentment, reducing your satisfaction. Similarly, if 
somebody else seems less happy, your satisfaction may go up. Therefore, for market 
pricing relationships, a value of ζ close to zero (to model indifference) or a negative 
value (to model jealousy) seems most likely13. 
In an equality matching relationship, you are unlikely to have strong views on the 
other person. Emotional contagion could occur as it happens with strangers. There-
fore, a low positive value of ζ seems most likely.  
                                                          
12
 Contagion may not be the best term for negative ζ, but we kept this for the sake of simplicity. 
13
 Above we have modeled the contagion of an individual by a group as the summation of the 
contagion by others in the group. For market pricing relationships, an alternative way of 
modeling would be to count the number of others that “beat” us.  
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Given that we believe ζ to depend on both the susceptibility of the user and their 
relationship with each other user, we will replace ζ in the models above with ζuv. To 
distinguish between the two factors that influence the value of ζuv , we define: 
ζuv = σu × ρuv,  
where  
• σu (0≤σu≤1) models the susceptibility of the user to emotional contagion, inde-
pendent of the other user involved, and  
• ρRelation(u,v) (-1≤ ρRelation(u,v) ≤1) models the contribution to contagion of the rela-
tionship between users u and v.  
In an ideal world, four values of ρ would suffice for all users, one for each type of re-
lationship. A complication, however, is that relationships are not often clear-cut; they 
can have elements of multiple types in them and can change per day. 
7.3 Conformity 
Many experiments have provided evidence that humans adjust their opinions to con-
form with those of a group when the majority or all of the group expresses a different 
opinion than the individual originally had. For instance, Asch (1951, 1956) showed 
that subjects confronted with a very easy judgment task (the control group had only 
0.7% errors) were influenced by the ‘obviously’ incorrect judgments of other (fake) 
subjects, producing 37% errors. There have been many studies showing that adding 
more members to the majority does not lead to a linear increase in conformity. While 
Asch (1951) found that a majority of three (i.e. one individual with three others who 
all disagreed) gave maximal conformity, later studies have shown that adding more 
members to the majority increases conformity, but with diminishing increments per 
added member (Latané & Wolf, 1981). Latané & Wolf proposed to model this effect 
as a power function: 
  
Influence(g) = µ × |g|λ   0 ≤ λ < 1 
 
with  µ a scaling constant that reflects the influence of a single person, and |g| the 
number of people in group g.  
A series of studies have found that having a social supporter, somebody whose 
judgment matches your own, decreases conformity substantially (Allan, 1975). It has 
therefore been proposed to divide the influence of the group by the number of indi-
viduals being influenced (Latané & Wolf, 1981).  
Two main reasons have been given for conformity (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The 
first is informational influence: individuals may conform because they trust other 
people’s judgment more than their own. The second is normative influence: individu-
als may conform because of group pressure, wanting others to like them. Informa-
tional influence may cause individuals to change both their public and private opin-
ions. Normative influence is more likely to change only the individuals’ public 
opinions, keeping their private opinions the same.  
When predicting satisfaction, we are mainly interested in individuals’ real satisfac-
tion, so using their private judgments. Therefore, informational influence is the one 
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that is most likely to affect our predictions. Above, we defined the impact on user u’s 
satisfaction of a new item i given this user’s pre-existing satisfaction s  as: 
 
Impact(u, i, s) = Impact(u, i) + (s-Impact(u, i)) × ε,         for 0 ≤ ε ≤1 
 
To make impact reflect the informational influence of a group g, we define:  
 
Impact(u, i, s, g) = Impact(u, i, s) + InformationalInfluence(u, g, i)14 
 
To calculate the informational influence, we will use Latané & Wolf’s (1981) pro-
posal. Since group g may be composed of multiple subgroups with different opinions,  
the informational influence of all subgroups is summed. The informational influence 
of a particular subgroup is a function of (1) its influence factor (as defined by Latané 
& Wolf), multiplied by (2) the difference in opinion of the subgroup and the user, and 
divided by (3) the number of people in the group outside the subgroup. This last ac-
counts for the social supporter effect proposed by Latané & Wolf. Hence, we define 
the informational influence on a user u of a group of others g  for item i as: 
 
InformationalInfluence(u, g, i) =  
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Informational influence is likely to depend on the personality of the individual, for in-
stance, their level of susceptibility to others’ opinions (Asch, 1951; 1956). Mausner 
(1954) also found self-confidence and perceived competence relative to others to have 
an impact on informational influence in a judgment task. Thus, a would-be expert on 
classical music is less likely to be influenced on classical music items than somebody 
who sees himself as a novice. This is why we have made µu sg dependent on u. Infor-
mational influence is also likely to depend on the relationship between an individual 
and their group, particularly on how much the others’ opinion is trusted. This is why 
we have made µu sg dependent on sg as well.   
Although we have suggested that normative influences may not change individu-
als’ private judgments, fake emotions expressed due to normative influences could 
exert contagion on the group. So, others may feel better because they wrongly believe 
that somebody else is happy. Above, we defined 
Sat(u, items, g) = Sat(u, items) + ∑
∈gv
itemsvitemsu )) ,Sat( ), ,Sat(Contagion(  
  
                                                          
14
 We are assuming that subjects can somehow deduct other people’s judgments from their re-
actions, separated from the mood they are in (so independent of s).  This is a simplification, 
as the formulas become too complex if we have to take s into consideration as well.  
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To deal with normative influences, we change this to: 
 
Sat(u, items, g) = Sat(u, items) +            
 ∑
∈
∪
gv
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As in the case of emotional contagion, it is rather difficult to model portrayed satisfac-
tion, as the portrayed satisfactions of users are interdependent. For simplification, we 
will assume that the normative influence happens simultaneously, and that the por-
trayed satisfaction of each user is only influenced by the real satisfaction of the other 
users, i.e. their satisfaction before normative influence happened. We define the por-
trayed satisfaction of a user u with sequence items given a group of others g as 
 
PortrayedSat(u, g, items) = Sat(u, items) + NormativeInfluence(u, g, items) 
 
with (similar to the definition of InformationalInfluence above): 
 
NormativeInfluence(u, g, items) =  
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and  Sat(sg, i) = Sat(v, i) for v ∈ sg.  
8 Experiment 2: Emotional Contagion 
The goal of this experiment is to shed some light on how emotional contagion might 
influence the emotions of individuals in a group, and what effect the type of relation-
ship might have.  
8.1 Experimental Design 
8.1.1 Method 
The experiment consisted of a number of fictional situations. In each one, subjects 
were asked to imagine that they would be watching television with someone, and that 
they liked the program a little. Two within-subjects variables were manipulated: (1) 
the emotions of the other person, which were either happier or unhappier; (2) the type 
of relationship the subject had with their imaginary partner, one of (a) Authority 
Ranking, with the other person higher in rank, (b) Communal Sharing, (c) Market 
Pricing and (d) Equality Matching. The combination yielded eight fictional situations, 
in each of which subjects were asked to rate how the other person’s emotion would 
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influence their own. Before the tasks, subjects’ susceptibility to emotional contagion 
was measured. 
The reasons why a scenario of watching TV was selected were twofold: (a) the 
measure of satisfaction should be independent of abilities (so that e.g. real world 
knowledge about their partner’s relative intelligence would not interfere), (b) the 
causes of satisfaction should not be transferable, that is, subjects should not be able to 
profit from another person’s gain (as they would in a lottery). Since it seems awkward 
to express level of satisfaction with TV programs using numbers, vague descriptions 
such as “you enjoy it a little” were used. 
8.1.2 Subjects 
Twenty-four undergraduate students of the University of Aberdeen participated vol-
untarily in the experiment, which took place in a classroom setting. Subjects were 
predominantly male (2 female, 18 male, 4 did not disclose their gender).  
8.1.3 Materials 
We used an adaptation of Doherty’s (1997) validated scale for measuring the sub-
jects’ susceptibility to emotional contagion. This scale consists of 15 items (three 
questions each related to the emotions of fear, anger, sadness, happiness and love). 
This was modified to exclude all items related to love, which were deemed unaccept-
able in a classroom setting. Each item had five answer categories (“never”, “rarely”, 
“usually”, “often”, “always”).  
To measure subjects’ believed emotional contagion, we asked eight questions of 
the form:  
 
“Think of somebody [who meets some criterion]. Assume you and this person are 
watching television together. You are enjoying the program a little. How would it 
make you feel to know that the other person is [other’s emotion]?  
My enjoyment would” 
 
Each question had five answer categories (“decrease a lot”, “decrease slightly”, 
“remaining the same”, “increase slightly”, and “increase a lot”). Negative and positive 
emotional contagion was simulated by stating that the other person was “enjoying it 
greatly” or “really hating it”. The different relationships were distinguished using the 
following criteria: 
 
• Authority Ranking: “you respect highly (maybe your grandfather, your boss, ..)”  
• Communal Sharing: “you share everything with (maybe your best friend)”  
• Market Pricing: “you do deals with (like, if you do the cooking, I will do the wash-
ing up)”  
• Equality Matching: “you are on equal footing with, you tend to get the same treat-
ment (maybe a cousin or a class mate)” 
 
The questionnaire used is shown in Appendix 1.  
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8.1.4 Research questions 
The aim of the experiment is to answer the following research questions: 
• Do subjects predict emotional contagion to happen when two people are watching 
television together? And if so, is there a difference between positive and negative 
emotional contagion, or do both happen to the same extent? 
• Does emotional contagion differ depending upon the relationship type? In particu-
lar, do Authority Ranking and Communal Sharing relationships indeed lead to 
more emotional contagion than Equality Matching and Market Pricing relation-
ships? 
• Does a Market Pricing relationship lead to a small or to an inverse emotional con-
tagion? So, if the other person’s enjoyment is higher than yours, does yours stay 
about the same or decrease further (and similarly, if the other person’s enjoyment 
is lower than yours, does yours stay the same or increase further)? 
• Does emotional contagion differ depending upon the susceptibility to emotional 
contagion, and is there an interaction with relationship type? 
8.2 Results and discussion 
One subject was omitted as they failed to complete the experiment, leaving 23. 
8.2.1 Susceptibility to emotional contagion  
We transformed the scale into numbers, using “never”=0, “rarely”=1, “usually=2”, 
“often”=3 and “always”=4. Analysis was carried out by averaging over these num-
bers. Despite its not being an interval scale, this was the way Doherty used the scale, 
and as he has validated his scale, we used it in a similar way. Subjects’ susceptibility 
to negative emotional contagion, was interpreted as the average score of the sadness, 
fear and anger questions, while the average over the happiness questions indicates 
susceptibility to positive contagion. To determine subjects’ overall susceptibility, we 
averaged their susceptibility to positive and negative emotional contagion.15 One sub-
ject did not answer the last of the fear related questions, and one subject did not an-
swer the last of the happiness related questions. One subject answered “never” to all 
questions, resulting in susceptibility scores of 0. The results suggest that subjects are 
more susceptible to positive than to negative emotions (two-tailed t-test, p<.0001).   
8.2.2 Emotional Contagion 
Figure 6 shows positive emotional contagion, that is, subjects’ reported changes in en-
joyment when the other person was happier than they, and negative emotional conta-
gion. To be able to analyze the data using parametric tests, we treated each answer 
category of question Q1-Q8 as a separate variable coded 1 or 0 depending on whether 
the answer was chosen or not, performing pairwise two-tailed T-tests.  
 
 
                                                          
15
 We could have averaged over all questions, but decided not to do this, as this would give a 
lot more weight to negative emotions, as we had to remove the love related questions.  
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Fig. 6. Results of Experiment 2 on questions Q1-4 (Positive emotional contagion), and Q5-8 
(negative emotional contagion). Y-axis shows number of subjects who replied as indicated.  
The distinction between different relationships influences positive emotional con-
tagion. Significantly more subjects responded that their enjoyment would remain the 
same in the Market Pricing scenario compared to Communal Sharing and Authority 
Ranking (p<0.05 for both tests). Similarly, more subjects responded that their enjoy-
ment would remain the same in Equality Matching compared to Communal Sharing 
(p<0.05). The difference between Equality Matching and Authority ranking was not 
significant. Reliably more subjects reported that their enjoyment would increase in the 
Authority Ranking and Communal Sharing Scenarios, compared to Market Pricing 
and Equality Matching (p<0.05 for all four tests). The differences between Authority 
Ranking and Communal sharing were not significant. These results indicate that the 
positive emotions of people you respect (Authority Ranking) or love (Communal 
Sharing) impact your emotion more than those of people you are in a more indifferent 
(Equality Matching) or competitive (Market Pricing) relationship with.  
The distinction between different relationships also influences negative emotional 
contagion. Significantly more subjects responded that their enjoyment would remain 
the same in the Market Pricing and Equality Matching scenarios, than Communal 
Sharing (p<0.05 for both tests). No significant differences were found with Authority 
ranking. Moreover, more subjects’ responded that their enjoyment would decrease in 
the Communal Sharing scenario, compared to Market Pricing and Equality Matching 
(p<0.05 for both tests). The differences between Authority Ranking and the other sce-
narios were, however, not significant. 
We found no real difference between negative and positive contagion. Despite our 
subjects, according to Doherty’s scale, being more susceptible to positive contagion, 
we did not see any difference in the results. One possible explanation is that the dif-
ference between “you enjoy a little” and “the other person is enjoying it greatly” is 
smaller than the difference between “you enjoy a little” and “the other person really 
hates it”. So, according to our proposed models, we would expect more contagion in 
the latter case, and this could counterbalance the smaller susceptibility. Another pos-
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sible explanation is that subjects are bad at predicting the size of a change in emotions 
(as confirmed by the affective forecasting literature discussed above), though they are 
good at predicting the direction of a change in emotions (so, our analysis of the rela-
tionship impact remains valid). In addition, the scale might not have given enough op-
tions to make small distinctions in the size of the change.  
8.2.3 Effect of susceptibility on emotional contagion 
We next investigated whether the subjects’ susceptibility to emotional contagion (as 
determined using Doherty’s scale) affected the reported emotional contagion. Figure 7 
shows the results of negative emotional contagion in two groups: one of subjects 
highly susceptible to negative emotional contagion, and one with the remaining sub-
jects. The highly susceptible group contained the 11 subjects whose susceptibility to 
negative emotions was above 1.5, meaning that on average they replied “usually” 
(which had a value of 2). At a glance, a higher percentage of subjects who were 
highly susceptible indeed showed negative contagion happening. The only substantial 
difference, however, is for the Communal Sharing relationship. 
A similar division into High and Low susceptibility groups for positive emotional 
contagion proved harder, since almost all subjects were highly susceptible, if we were 
to use the same cut-off point as before. We would be left with only 5 subjects in the 
Low group, which is too few to reason sensibly with percentages. We would have to 
raise the cut-off point to just above 2, in order to get sensible group sizes. However, 
this seems rather arbitrary, particularly as six subjects have a score of exactly 2, and it 
seems hard to defend an average of “usually” as indicating low susceptibility. 
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Fig. 7. Percentage of subjects who answered that their enjoyment would decrease, remain the 
same, or increase for questions Q5-Q8 for High and Low susceptibility groups. 
8.2.4 Answers to research questions 
From the analysis above, we find the following answers to our research questions: 
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• Occurrence of emotional contagion. Most subjects do think that emotional conta-
gion will happen, but only for certain situations (see below).  
• Difference between positive and negative contagion. We did not find a difference, 
but this may be due to the experimental setup (as explained above).  
• Effect of relationship type. There is a clear effect of relationship type on emotional 
contagion. We did indeed find that Authority Ranking and Communal Sharing re-
lationships lead to more emotional contagion than Equality Matching and Market 
Pricing relationships.  
• Market pricing. Hardly any subjects showed inverse contagion, and the data seems 
to point more to a very small positive value of ρMarket pricing  than a negative one. 
• Effect of susceptibility. There is some indication that susceptibility to emotional 
contagion has an effect for Communal Sharing relationships. Given that ρMarket pric-
ing and ρEquality matching seem close to zero, it would have been hard to find an effect 
for those (as susceptibility is multiplied with ρ in our models). We do not have 
enough data to draw strong conclusions here, but it seems wise to leave the suscep-
tibility parameter in the model. 
9 Embarrassment and the issue of privacy 
Lorrie Cranor, in her invited talk at UM2005, mentioned the case of a user whose 
Tivo caused him considerable embarrassment when it wrongly assumed he was gay 
(having observed him watching gardening and cooking programs), and started re-
cording gay programs for him (Zaslow, 2002). In a group recommendation situation, 
this would be worse. Imagine your embarrassment if the TV started showing erotic 
items to you and your friends, because it has wrongly assumed you are interested in 
them. Particularly if, for the sake of transparency, it explained that it was showing 
them, because of your interests. This is not merely a question of the system making 
wrong inferences, since it is possible that a user is interested in such items, but would 
rather their family or friends did not know. So, while the issue of privacy is regarded 
as increasingly important in the user modeling community (Kobsa & Cranor, 2005), it 
becomes additionally important when recommendations are made to groups.  
To improve privacy in a group recommender, each item could have a privacy 
measure associated with it, in addition to a rating. This measure could be modeled as 
a number between 0 and 1, with 1 meaning complete disclosure (the user does not 
care whether others know this rating) and 0 meaning complete privacy (the rating can 
only be used for personal recommendations). The group aggregation strategies could 
take this measure into account (e.g. attaching less weight to ratings the user wants to 
keep private).   
A complication is that privacy is not only important to hide facts that are inherently 
embarrassing (like somebody wanting to hide their interest in building explosives). 
When discussing conformity above, we mentioned normative influences: people 
changing their judgment to fit in with the group, to be liked. So, teenagers might want 
to hide far more innocent things, such as a preference for a particular band, when it is 
clear that all their friends detest it. When a recommendation is made to a group, we 
have to ensure that individuals still have this option to conform, to hide the fact that 
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they are different. One way to achieve this may be to let users have separate ratings 
depending on the circumstances. For instance, the user could have a rating for private 
use, one for their family, another for their friends, etc, allowing them to have different 
personas in different settings as advocated by various privacy researchers (e.g. Kay et 
al., 2003). This is backed up by a world-wide-web poll which showed that almost 
60% of users would value being able to assume different aliases/roles on the Internet 
(GVU 1998, as reported in Kobsa & Schreck, 2003). An advantage of the multiple 
personas idea is that it extends to implicit modeling: when observing user actions, 
only the user model of the active persona could be updated.  
A limitation of the different personas approach is that humans are fallible, and it is 
quite possible that a user would occasionally forget to switch from his family persona 
to his private persona, when starting to watch some late night programs. Some seem-
ingly obvious ways to prevent this unfortunately do not work: 
• Always using a private persona when the user is alone would not give the group 
recommender any implicit data about individual user preferences to work from. A 
possible workaround may be to have the user give explicit permission to transfer 
data between user profiles, but this would require quite some effort from the user 
as it needs doing regularly in order to keep the profile up to date. 
• It is cumbersome to ask users which profile they would like to use whenever the 
group changes (assuming this is automatically detectable). Moreover, switching 
personas may provoke suspicion (“my husband is hiding his tv preferences from 
me, so he must be a pervert or a maniac”).  
 
Another limitation of using different personas is that an individual might not know 
beforehand what the opinion of the others will be, making it harder to conform.  
Because of these two limitations, we will assume that even when users are using 
multiple personas, they may occasionally want to hide the preferences of their per-
sona. This means that scrutability in a group recommender with varying groups 
should never go as far as divulging the details of the individuals’ ratings to the group. 
In the movie group recommender system PolyLens, where inferred ratings are option-
ally visible to the group, 93% of users preferred to share their ratings with the group, 
suggesting that utility outbalances privacy (O’Connor et al., 2001). However, 
PolyLens is a special case, as users would normally be members of only one group, 
and that group tends to be based on a similar taste in movies or a close friendship.  
We will use anonymity: when telling the group why a certain recommendation was 
made, individual ratings and identities are not divulged, avoiding such explanations as 
“This was recommended because Pete really likes it”. Instead, we could use explana-
tions like “This was recommended because one of you really likes it”. However, in 
smaller groups, and particularly if groups vary regularly, it may still be quite easy to 
figure out who is meant (e.g. one might notice that whenever Pete is present, chil-
dren’s movies are recommended, or the Rolling Stones are not played). Knowing that 
somebody really likes something would allow a group to apply social pressure or to 
use deduction to find out who the culprit is.  
It therefore seems wise to hide the existence of strong individual preferences that 
go against the majority of the group. At least we should avoid explanations like “This 
was recommended because one of you really likes it”. We assume that users will 
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know what group aggregation strategy is being used, to make the system more trans-
parent. The question then arises whether the aggregation strategies differ on how 
much they protect privacy. For instance, the Least Misery Strategy selects items no-
body really hates. So, if you notice that an item you really like is not selected, and 
perhaps note that many other people in the group seem to regret its omission, you may 
get suspicious that somebody else hates it. The Average Strategy, by its nature, would 
only give the information that most people probably like or dislike an item. So, we as-
sume that the Average Strategy will protect privacy better. In theory, it seems that 
Multiplicative Utilitarianism (the strategy which performed best keeping users satis-
fied in Masthoff, 2004a) and Average Without Misery would protect privacy some-
where between the Least Misery and the Average strategy. In Experiment 3 below, we 
will investigate users’ views on this. The protection of privacy could then be an im-
portant aspect of deciding which aggregation strategy to use. 
In order to disguise user preferences further, we could add an additional, virtual 
member to the group, clearly a different one for each group. This could be an embod-
ied agent presenting the recommendations. Users would be told that the virtual mem-
ber has tastes of its own, and that these tastes will influence the recommendations as 
well, making it harder to attribute tastes to individuals, as they could always blame 
the virtual character (who could be quite vocal about some of its tastes). It would also 
add a bit of serendipity to the system. Rather than always showing the group what 
they clearly will like, items can be thrown in for which it is unknown whether they 
will be liked.  The virtual member could also impact conformity, since normative in-
fluences diminish when another member of the group is shown to share your opinion. 
An individual with a taste deviating from the group might feel less lonely, and more 
likely to express an opinion, though this depends on them trusting the virtual member.  
10 Experiment 3: Privacy of Group Aggregation Strategies 
In this experiment, we investigate the impact different group aggregation strategies 
may have on privacy. We are mainly interested in the extent to which users may think 
a group aggregation strategy could betray their tastes to others, assuming they will be 
most anxious to hide strong opinions (that they really like or really hate an item) and 
opinions that deviate from those of others in the group.  
We assume that a group recommender potentially betrays someone’s taste if from a 
recommendation given (in particular, from the inclusion or absence of an item in the 
recommendation) others in the group are quite sure that somebody in the group likes 
or hates the item. Note that this does not necessarily betray who likes or hates the item 
(unless the group has only two members). That information could be obtained through 
social pressure, or knowledge gained from different (sub)groups. In this experiment, 
we will investigate to what extent users feel sure about the existence of somebody in 
the group with a taste opposite to their own. Note that “feel sure” is different from 
“are sure”. We could of course theoretically analyze the aggregation strategies, to de-
termine which strategy provides most privacy, but it seems equally important to de-
termine which strategy is regarded as providing most privacy.  
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10.1 Experimental Design 
Twelve graduate students and staff of the University of Aberdeen’s computing sci-
ence department participated in the experiment. Subjects were predominantly male 
(11 male, 1 female). We used a within-subjects design. Subjects were told to assume 
that they were going to listen to music together with a group of other people, that the 
DJ had everyone’s opinions on songs as ratings between 1 (really hate) to 10 (really 
like), and that the DJ would use the individual people’s ratings to calculate a rating of 
each song for the group. As a within subject variable, four hypothetical situations 
were sketched, each corresponding to a group aggregation strategy. All situations 
(with a small exception, see below) followed the format:  
“The DJ has calculated ratings for the group by [group aggregation strategy].  
1. A song your really like has not been played. 
− How sure are you that somebody in the group hates it?  
− How sure are you that most of the group hates it?  
2. A song you really hate has been played.  
− How sure are you that somebody in the group likes it?  
− How sure are you that most of the group likes it?” 
We used a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “not sure at all” to “extremely sure”. 
From the group aggregation strategies described in (Masthoff, 2004a), the four we 
used were: 
• Average: “averaging all individual ratings.” 
• Least Misery: “taking the minimum of individual ratings.” 
• Multiplicative Utilitarian: “multiplying the individual ratings.” 
• Average Without Misery: “removing all songs anybody really hated and averaging 
the individual ratings for the remaining songs.” 
A slight modification to the question was made for Average Without Misery. As 
this strategy makes it impossible for an item you really hate to be selected, we re-
moved the word “really” from the sentence “A song you really hate has been played.” 
See Appendix 2 for the exact wording of the questions.  
10.2 Results and Discussion 
It should be noted that none of the aggregation strategies should really produce cer-
tainty on any of the questions. We left the description of the situation purposely 
vague: subjects did not know anything about the ratings given by others (we had no 
choice on this, given the questions we were going to ask). Any of the strategies could 
result in a song an individual really liked (or hated) not being played (or being played) 
without anybody in the group having the opposite opinion. For instance, if everybody 
in the group liked all the songs, then a lowest rating of 7 (somebody still quite liking 
it) might result in it not being played. Therefore, theoretically subjects could have an-
swered 1 (not sure at all) to all questions. However, as would happen in a real life 
situation, subjects seemed to assume that everybody would have some songs they 
liked and some they hated. Also, their answers may have been relative: indicating that 
they thought a statement more likely to be true for one strategy than for another. 
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Fig. 8. Left-hand side: Average over subjects of the certainty scores (1=not sure at all, 
7=extremely sure) Right-hand side: Percentage of subjects being certain (score of 5 or above). 
Two subjects were puzzled by the “a song you hate has been played” questions for 
Average Without Misery. They did not answer these, stating “This can’t happen” and 
“DJ cheated”. One of these subjects also did not answer the “a song you really hate 
has been played” questions for the Least Misery strategy. They are right that these 
situations would be unlikely to happen, though both situations can theoretically occur.  
Figure 8 shows the average over subjects of the certainty scores, and the percent-
age of subjects who were sure (i.e., had a score ≥ 5). The only strategy that clearly 
seems to evoke different responses is Least Misery: all subjects were sure that when a 
song they really liked had not been played somebody hated it, with an average score 
of 6.5. They also were very unsure that most hated it (average of 2.25). This is exactly 
the kind of situation where tensions in a group might arise: an individual being upset 
because one of his favorites has been skipped, being extremely sure that somebody 
else hated it (and therefore caused the skipping), and not believing that everybody 
else hated it (so, feeling free to prosecute the “sinner”). Thus, Least Misery seems bad 
at protecting privacy. Although the inferences being made may well be wrong, they 
can cause distress when they are right (as they often will be).  
We assumed in the previous section that the Average Strategy would protect pri-
vacy better than the Multiplicative and the Average Without Misery strategies, as the 
latter both prevent misery. This was not confirmed by the results. The trend was for 
the Multiplicative Strategy to perform slightly (but not significantly) better than the 
Average Strategy. This shows that users are not very good at grasping the implica-
tions of the strategies. As one subject commented “I have no intuitive feeling for the 
difference between averaging and multiplying when non-zero numbers are involved”. 
This corresponds with findings by a.o. Tversky and Kahneman (as discussed in 
Carofiglio & de Rosis, 2001) on how bad people are in probabilitistic reasoning. 
Though one may expect our subjects to be better at this than the average population, 
given their computing science background, Barwise (as discussed in Carofiglio & de 
Rosis, 2001) found that even mathematicians are not better at such tasks.  
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Overall, we conclude that Least Misery should be avoided for privacy reasons, but 
that it is fine to use the Multiplicative strategy. 
11 Conclusions 
There has been little work so far on computational models of affective state that can 
predict (rather than measure) how the user of a recommender system will be feeling. 
González et al (2004) have worked on the modelling of affective state for a recom-
mender system, but their model is mainly based on an emotional intelligence test 
combined with updating of emotional values based on feedback to recommendations. 
There has been more research on the modelling of the affective state of artificial 
agents, where emotions are often related to plan completion and goal attainment, and 
modelling often happens using belief networks (e.g. de Rosis et al., 2003; Grath, 
2000). Users in a recommender system do not really have plans (unless it is to be en-
tertained or informed), so this research does not tend to generalize to recommender 
systems. This paper tries to fill the gap. Modelling affective state is particularly im-
portant when adapting to groups of users, as a group adaptation system will not be 
able to please all of its users all of the time. In such a case, an accurate prediction of 
the affective state of individual users can be helpful to prevent any user becoming too 
dissatisfied. Models of affective state can also be used to evaluate group aggregation 
strategies (Masthoff, 2004a).  
We have proposed four different functions for modelling user satisfaction in a 
group recommender system that recommends sequences of items, incorporating as-
similation and decay of emotions with time.   
The evaluation of models of affective state is particularly difficult. In this paper, 
we have explained the issues involved, and have shown how evaluation is possible via 
indirect experiments, simulations, and experiments in another domain. In the process, 
we have found that Variant 3 of our satisfaction functions seems to perform best, and 
confirmed that time decay and assimilation parameters (δ and ε) depend on the user.  
Unfortunately, modelling affective state becomes additionally complex when deal-
ing with groups, because of members of the group influencing each other’s emotions, 
via emotional contagion and conformity. We have shown how this can be incorpo-
rated into the models. We have also shown that the type of relationship the user has 
with others is important to take into account. In particular, Authority Ranking and 
Communal Sharing relationships seem to evoke more emotional contagion then Mar-
ket Pricing and Equality Matching relationships.  
Models of individual satisfaction are not only useful when adapting to groups. As 
argued in (Masthoff, 2003; 2004b), adaptation to individuals can sometimes also 
benefit from group aggregation strategies, for instance, when ratings on multiple crite-
ria need to be combined, or when virtual group members are added, e.g. representing 
a teacher. 
Models of affective state are not only useful for recommender systems, but also for 
other adaptive systems such as intelligent tutoring systems. While initially most of the 
focus in intelligent tutoring systems was on modelling of and adapting to cognitive as-
pects of the learner, gradually interest has increased in modelling of and adapting to a 
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learner’s affective state (see for instance Picard et al., 2004; del Soldato, 1994; de Vin-
cent, 2003). Wosnitza & Volet (2005) discuss the importance of human teachers having 
access to their students’ affective states. Understanding a student’s affective state can al-
low an intelligent tutoring system to adapt its instruction, material selection and feedback 
to keep the learner sufficiently motivated and challenged; it can also be used to teach 
learners how to deal with failure and frustration (Burleson & Picard, 2004). While exist-
ing work tends to measure affective state, rather than calculating it, and this can be done 
theory-neutrally (Picard et al., 2004), a theory is required to predict changes in affective 
state. For instance, if you want to select the next exercise for a student to do, it would be 
good if you could predict how the student would be feeling after each possible exercise. 
We believe that the work presented in this paper can be adapted to do this. It would also 
avoid the need for continuous self-reporting which interrupts the learning experience and 
the need for intrusive and costly sensors.  
A lot of work on group modelling has been on modelling common knowledge be-
tween group members (e.g. Introne & Alterman, 2006; Suebnukarn & Haddawy, 
2006), modelling how a group interacts (e.g. Read et al, 2006; McLaren et al., 2006) 
and group formation based on individual models (e.g. Read et al., 2006; Alfonseca et 
al., 2006). The affective state of the group members is normally not taken into ac-
count. It would be interesting to explore how affective state can be used as part of 
group formation (or group break up), and to model not just how individuals are con-
tributing and how their knowledge deviates from the group’s, but also how they are 
likely to feel because of this.  
One might think that accurate predictions of individual satisfaction can also be 
used to improve the transparency of adaptive systems: showing how satisfied others 
in your group are, or how satisfied criteria are, could improve the users’ understand-
ing of the working of the system and perhaps make it easier to accept items they do 
not like. This may be a good idea for a system that adapts to individual users. How-
ever, in a group adaptation system, users’ need for privacy is likely to conflict with 
their need for transparency. An important task of a group adaptation system is to 
avoid embarrassment. Users often like to conform with the group to avoid being dis-
liked. We modelled this normative conformity as part of our modelling of how others 
in the group can influence individual affective state. We may be able to use this to 
predict how embarrassed a user would be with disclosure of their judgement, and base 
our explanation of system recommendations on this. We have also investigated how 
different group aggregation strategies may affect privacy. 
This paper has discussed many of the issues involved in modelling affective state 
in recommender systems. We hope it will inspire a lot more research into this area.  
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Experiment 2 
 
Gender: male / female 
 
If someone I’m talking with begins to cry, I get teary-eyed. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
Being with a happy person picks me up when I’m feeling down. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
When someone smiles warmly at me, I smile back and feel warm inside. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
I get filled with sorrow when people talk about the death of their loved ones. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
I clench my jaws and my shoulders get tight when I see angry faces on the news. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
It irritates me to be around angry people. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
Watching the fearful faces of victims on the news makes me try to imagine how 
they might be feeling. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
I tense when overhearing an angry quarrel. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
Being around happy people fills my mind with happy thoughts. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
I notice myself getting tense when I’m around people who are stressed out. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
I cry at sad movies. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
Listening to the shrill screams of a terrified child in the dentist’s waiting room 
makes me feel nervous. 
  never  rarely  usually  often  always 
 
Q1. Think of somebody you respect highly (maybe your grandfather, your boss, ..). 
Assume you and this person are watching television together. You are enjoying the 
program a little. How would it make you feel to know that the other person is enjoy-
ing it greatly? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease  
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase  
a lot 
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Q2. Think of somebody you share everything with (maybe your best friend). 
Assume you and this person are watching television together. You are enjoying the 
program a little. How would it make you feel to know that the other person is enjoy-
ing it greatly? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease  
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase 
a lot 
 
Q3. Think of somebody you do deals with (like, if you do the cooking, I will do the 
washing up). Assume you and this person are watching television together. You are 
enjoying the program a little. How would it make you feel to know that the other 
person is enjoying it greatly? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease  
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase 
a lot 
 
Q4. Think of somebody you are on equal footing with, you tend to get the same 
treatment (maybe a cousin or a class mate). Assume you and this person are watch-
ing television together. You are enjoying the program a little. How would it make 
you feel to know that the other person is enjoying it greatly? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease 
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase 
a lot 
 
Q5. Think again of somebody you respect highly (maybe your grandfather, your 
boss). Assume you and this person are watching television together. You are enjoy-
ing the program a little. How would it make you feel to know that the other person 
is really hating it? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease  
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase  
a lot 
 
Q6. Think again of somebody you share everything with (maybe your best friend). 
Assume you and this person are watching television together. You are enjoying the 
program a little. How would it make you feel to know that the other person is really 
hating it? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease  
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase  
a lot 
 
Q7. Think again of somebody you do deals with (like, if you do the cooking, I will 
do the washing up). Assume you and this person are watching television together. 
You are enjoying the program a little. How would it make you feel to know that the 
other person is really hating it? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease  
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase  
a lot 
 
Q8. Think again of somebody you are on equal footing with, you tend to get the 
same treatment (maybe a cousin or a class mate). Assume you and this person are 
watching television together. You are enjoying the program a little. How would it 
make you feel to know that the other person is really hating it? My enjoyment would 
 decrease 
a lot 
 decrease  
slightly 
 remain the same  increase 
slightly 
 increase  
a lot 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Experiment 3 
Assume you are going to listen to music together with a group of other people. 
The DJ has asked all of you for your opinions on twenty songs. Each of you has rated 
each song from 1 (really hate) to 10 (really like). The DJ will use the individual peo-
ple’s ratings to calculate a rating of each song for the group. The DJ will then play the 
ten songs with the highest rating. 
 
The DJ has calculated ratings for the group by averaging all individual ratings.  
 
A song you really like has NOT been played. How sure are you that  
somebody in the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
 
A song you really hate has been played. How sure are you that 
somebody in the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure  
 
The DJ has calculated ratings for the group by taking the minimum of individual rat-
ings.  
 
A song you really like has NOT been played. How sure are you that  
somebody in the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
 
A song you really hate has been played. How sure are you that  
somebody in the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure  
 
The DJ has calculated ratings for the group by multiplying the individual ratings.  
 
A song you really like has NOT been played. How sure are you that 
somebody in the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
 
A song you really hate has been played. How sure are you that  
somebody in the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure  
 
The DJ has calculated ratings for the group by removing all songs anybody really 
hated and averaging the individual ratings for the remaining songs.  
 
A song you really like has NOT been played. How sure are you that 
somebody in the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group hates it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
 
A song you hate has been played. How sure are you that  
somebody in the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
most of the group likes it? Not sure at all   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely sure 
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